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Reviewing the narrative of the double 
standard Europe concerning collective 
minority rights 
 
By Helga Molbæk-Steensig* 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
The topic for this article is the narrative of discrepancies between the minority 
rights that the European Union (EU) demands of potential candidate states, 
itself, and the current member states. Several scholars on the Western Balkans 
have noted that EU conditionality towards the Balkans; first within the Regional 
Approach and since the Stability and Association Process (SAP) have demanded 
the establishment of collective minority rights and active state duty for their 
protection, while the EUs internal approach to minority rights is based on the 
principle of non-discrimination. In this article, I will review whether this narrative 
has root in a real double standard. Second, I will look into why either the 
narrative or the double standard has been established, and finally whether it is a 
reasonable policy or narrative to cultivate. The article will start out with an 
introduction to the differences between individual and collective rights, and 
positive and negative state duties. Following this, there will be a chapter on the 
traditional use of collective rights Yugoslavia before the wars. Third will follow an 
account and analysis of the human rights regimes currently in use within the 
EU. Fourth will be a section describing the demands concerning minority rights 
that the EU has for SAP members. Finally, there will be a conclusion comparing 
the use of individual and collective minority rights historically in Yugoslavia, 
currently in the EU, and in EU conditionality towards the post-Yugoslavian 
states.  
 
The reason for asking this question is closely linked with EU soft power. The 
concept of EU conditionality towards third countries and potential future 
member states was first applied to the Western Balkans. If we consider the EU a 
force for peace and prosperity, which the EU certainly does itself and which the 
award of the Nobel Peace prize also suggests, then the preservation of its soft 
power is important. In Joseph Nye’s conceptualisation, soft power is getting 
others to do what you want by making them want what you want. When UK 
diplomat Robert Cooper analysed EU soft power specifically, he found it to rest 
on three things, protection, recipe for success, and participation. If a double 
standard is present between EU domestic policy and conditionality as the 
authors displayed above suggest, then the EU is not sharing its recipe for 
success with candidate states, and is undermining the option of participation for 
SAP states by making it harder to become member states. Such a situation could 
dent EU soft power and thereby its potential positive influence on human rights 
development within and outside the union.  
 
  
* Helga Molbæk-Steensig is a cross-disciplinary scholar who has recently earned her MA in International 
Studies from the University of Aarhus. In addition, she holds a BA in Balkan studies from the University 
of Copenhagen. Her field of study includes human rights, transitional justice, comparative constitutional 
law, international maritime law, and EU enlargement.  
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Introduction: The different kinds of 
human and minority rights 
In human rights’ terminology, there is a 
differentiation between positive and 
negative human rights. Human rights 
generally deal with how states treat their 
citizens. Only states, not individuals, can 
be brought before the various human 
rights courts. When individuals violate the 
rights of others it is still the state that is 
responsible if it fails to prevent the 
violation or investigate it.1 Negative 
human rights denotes things that states 
have a duty not to do, while positive rights 
denotes something that the states have to 
do. Negative human rights are also 
referred to as first generation rights and 
are political in nature, while positive 
human rights are second generation and 
are economic and social in nature. In 
1966, the UN announced two separate 
human rights covenants, which denotes 
the first and second generation rights, 
namely the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The 
rationale behind this division was that the 
ICCPR could be implemented immediately 
because it consisted of negative rights, 
while the ICESCR due to its positive 
nature would have to be implemented step 
by step as the states got the funds to fulfil 
their obligations. However, following this 
distinction, the UN General Assembly 
clarified in the Vienna Declaration for the 
world conference on human rights in 1993 
that human rights are indivisible and 
interrelated and first generation rights do 
not have primacy over second generation 
rights.2  
  
The division in negative and positive or 
first and second generation rights is 
somewhat problematic. First, negative 
rights are not without cost; states must 
make positive changes with substantial 
funding to ensure first generation rights 
                                              
 
1 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
Article 13. 
2 Vienna declaration and programme of action 1993: 
Article 5 
for their citizens, because the state is 
responsible for violations committed by 
other citizens and not just for its own 
actions. The state’s duty to maintain order 
becomes a human rights obligation with 
the emergence of first generation rights 
allocating resources to police and courts.3 
Second, the division into first and second 
generation rights have led some scholars 
and actors to assume that the second 
generation rights go further than the first 
generation rights and are therefore more 
optional, which in turn has led to the 
argument that hungry people do not care 
about the freedom of speech.4 For decent 
human lives, the rights listed in the 
ICESCR are in many cases more 
important. Third, the division has led to a 
politisation of human rights with for 
example Ernst Forsthoff considering 
second generation rights to be socialist 
and incompatible with the liberal first 
generation rights.5 This politsation is 
dangerous because it suggests a 
dichotomy that is most often not present, 
and it makes the second generation rights 
optional or even unthinkable for liberal 
states. It must here be established that 
there is no direct dichotomy between first 
and second generation human rights, but 
there may be a dichotomy between 
principles of entrepreneurial freedoms and 
ideas of free markets, and the second 
generation rights to work and fair wages. 
Entrepreneurial freedoms are, however, 
not human rights. Similar to how political 
and civil rights can be construed as 
restrictions in a state’s otherwise 
utilitarian actions6, the right to fair wages7 
and the prohibition of slavery8 are 
restrictions on the kinds of businesses 
that can be conducted, but they are not in 
conflict with other human rights.  
In human rights terminology, there is also 
a distinction of particular importance to 
minority rights, between collective and 
individual rights. Individual rights are 
                                              
 
3 Tomuschat 2009: 24 
4 Ibid.: 19-21 
5 Ibid.: 21-22 
6 Ibid.: 25 
7 ICESCR Article 7 
8 ICCPR Article 8 
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granted individuals because they are 
human beings, while collective rights are 
granted specific, often disadvantaged, 
groups. Examples of collective rights are 
Article 18 in the African Convention on 
Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) on 
special protection for families with 
children and the elderly,9 or the granting 
of a minority a specific number of seats in 
parliament.10 
 
Yugoslav tradition of collective 
minority rights 
Yugoslavia was, and the post-yugoslavian 
countries are, a complex region when it 
comes to nationalities and minorities. In 
the Yugoslavian constitutions, there were 
a distinction between the constituent 
peoples, and the national minorities. This 
categorisation was instrumental in 
deciding which cultural rights which 
groups of people were granted. At the time 
of the establishment of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) the 
six republics existed, but only five 
constituent peoples were recognised, the 
Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, 
and Macedonians.11 SFRY principally 
viewed all peoples and nationalities within 
the federation as equals, but only the 
constituent peoples had the right to self-
determination,12 and while all nationalities 
had the right to free use of their 
languages13, only the languages of the 
republics were official and could be used 
in law and court.14 When Muslim as an 
ethnicity became recognised in 1961, it 
granted the group more cultural rights, 
which increased to include self-
determination with the recognition of 
Muslims as a constituent people in 
1968.15  
 Thus, in the SFRY both individual 
and collective minority rights were 
                                              
 
9 ACHPR art 18(3-4) 
10 Croatian Constitutional Act on Human Rights and 
Freedoms and the Rights of Ethnic and National 
Communities and Minorities Article 17 
11 Linklater 2003: 50 
12 SFRY constitution 1946 Article 1 
13 Ibid. Article 13 
14 Ibid. Art 120 
15 Bideleux & Jeffries 2007: 330 
employed. The principle of equality of all 
citizens despite ethnicity or nationality, 
which was present in the constitution 
from 1946 and following amendments in 
1963 and 197416 is an individual right. 
There were, however also collective 
approaches to minority rights, such as the 
protection of culture and use of 
language17 or the autonomy of the two 
Serbian provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina 
in which there were large groups of 
Albanians and Hungarians respectively. 
Soon after SFRY’s break with the Soviet 
Union (USSR) efforts were made to better 
the conditions for national minorities in 
SFRY. Bilingual administrations were 
established in Kosovo and in Rijeka, Zadar 
and parts of Istria for Serbo-Croatian 
along with Albanian and Italian 
respectively.18 Other minorities could 
apply for and habitually received federal 
funding for schools or classes, 
newspapers, folklore groups and theatre 
performances in their languages.19 These 
kinds of policies are collective rights 
approaches to minority protection. They 
are more extensive and useful to the 
minorities than individual rights, but as 
with all differential treatment, there is a 
risk of some groups gaining lesser rights 
than others. As mentioned earlier the 
large group of Slavic Muslims living in the 
BiH republic were not recognised as a 
national minority nor as a constituent 
people before the 1960s. Similarly, the 
Roma never gained any collective minority 
rights within the SFRY. This is an example 
of how the individual right of non-
discrimination does not harmonise 
perfectly with the positive collective 
minority rights of cultural protection. For 
years, the Bosniak minority was kept from 
even registering as a minority group and 
the Roma, perhaps the least privileged 
group in the SFRY were cut off from 
minority protection of any kind, even 
though the federation had gone to great 
                                              
 
16 SFRY constitution 1946: Article 21, SFRY 
constitution 1963: Article 33, SFRY constitution 
1974: Article 154. 
17 SFRY constitution 1946: Article 13. 
18 Shoup 1963: 74 
19 Ibid: 75 
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lengths to legally protect and promote 
minority rights. Similarly, the division of 
ethnic groups into constituent peoples 
and national minorities with homelands 
outside the federation kept Kosovo-
Albanians who are the majority within 
Kosovo from gaining the legal right to self-
determination. 
  
In the application of these collective and 
individual, negative and positive minority 
rights in the SFRY, the practical changes 
in the lower levels of the communist party 
and in everyday life were harder to achieve 
than the dictation of norms. Party 
commissions were criticised for not 
accepting or promoting minority members 
to a great degree, and the practical 
administration of minority rights in 
schools failed in many cases.20 Issues with 
implementation of minority rights is a 
well-known obstacle also outside the 
SFRY. A state can decide to end 
discrimination for jobs within the state, 
but detecting and combatting 
discrimination between private citizens is 
more problematic. It can be difficult to 
determine when discrimination takes 
place between private persons, and 
depending on the court system and 
principles of right to action in place, it 
may prove challenging for citizens to bring 
discrimination cases before the courts. 
Similarly, collective minority rights can 
lead to disgruntled majority populations 
who argue that the principle of non-
discrimination has been abandoned.  
 
Minority rights approach within the 
European Union 
The EU’s approach to minority rights for 
existing member states is rooted in the 
EU’s own charter of rights, the CFREU’s 
Article 21.  
1. Any discrimination based on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, 
ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or 
belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, 
property, birth, disability, age or 
                                              
 
20 Ibid.:78 
sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited. 
2. Within the scope of application of 
the Treaty establishing the 
European Community and of the 
Treaty on European Union, and 
without prejudice to the special 
provisions of those Treaties, any 
discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited.21 
 
Thus, within the EU, traditional principles 
of non-discrimination on ethnicity, 
gender, religion and so forth is coupled 
with a prohibition on discrimination 
according to nationality. This is a 
cornerstone in EU integration and the 
freedom of movement for workers. The 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) has a provision on the 
positive duties of the EU institutions to 
further the principle of non-
discrimination. This suggests that 
although this individual minority right 
looks like a negative right, the states and 
institutions also have to take positive 
action to make sure that it applies outside 
the administration itself. The TFEU gives 
the Council when unanimous 
competences to cooperate with the 
European Parliament (EP) using the 
special legislative procedure to take 
“appropriate action” to combat 
discrimination.22 Additionally, the 
Commission can act according to the 
ordinary legislative procedure to adopt 
principles to incentivise member states to 
combat discrimination without actually 
harmonising laws.23 This suggests several 
things. First, the TFEU opens for several 
approaches to take action against 
discrimination suggesting that it is an 
important goal for the union. Second, the 
wording concerning what kind of action 
can be taken is vague, suggesting that at 
the time of writing the TFEU the EU had 
not yet decided on a definite approach. 
Third, the exclusion of harmonising 
legislation by the ordinary legislative 
                                              
 
21 CFREU Article 21. 
22 TFEU art 19(1) 
23 Ibid.: art 19(2) 
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procedure, which allows for qualified or 
simple majority rather than unanimity, 
suggests that minority rights protection is 
a sensitive subject in cooperation between 
states. The EU itself adheres to the 
principle of non-discrimination, but 
enforcing it within member states and 
agreeing to positive legislation to combat it 
between private citizens is a more 
sensitive matter.  
 
 The above only deals with the 
positive duty aspects of the largely 
negative individual minority right of non-
discrimination. The policy space available 
in the TFEU Article 19 is already limited 
in this least controversial type of minority 
protection.  
The TFEU’s Article 19 provides the 
procedures for legislating towards non-
discrimination in the EU and the CFREU’s 
Article 21 provides that the ethnic rights 
fall within the principle of non-
discrimination. This focus in the treaty 
texts has led several scholars to claim that 
the EU is hypocritical in demanding 
collective minority rights protection in 
candidate states while relying only on the 
principle of non-discrimination for itself.24 
While it is certainly the case that existing 
EU member states have issues with 
enforcing both individual and collective 
minority protection, largely for the reasons 
provided above that collective rights can 
be unpopular and perceived as unfair, it is 
not true as Hughes and Sasse or 
Schwellnus claims that minority 
protection is not part of the acquis.25  
  
The discrepancy between the claims of 
Schwellnus and others and the acts on 
minority protection in the acquis that I 
have found may lie in the use of 
terminology. The basis for EU policy on 
ethnic groups is indeed the principle of 
non-discrimination, but that does not 
mean that it does not entail legislative and 
other duties for the union and the 
member states, nor that it is an obstacle 
                                              
 
24 Cerrutti 2014: 787 and Schwellnus 2006: 187 
25 Schwellnus 2006: 186, Hughes and Sasse 2003: 1-
2 
to introducing collective minority 
protection. In EU terminology, the goal of 
inclusion and equal treatment of all 
people regardless of sex, ethnicity, 
religion, ability, and so forth is reached 
through policies of non-discrimination 
and policies of anti-discrimination. In this 
terminology, non-discrimination can be 
seen as the fundamental right to not be 
discriminated against while anti-
discrimination measures are used when 
systemic oppression keeps a group from 
enjoying the freedoms guaranteed under 
the principle of non-discrimination. 
 
“Anti-discrimination legislation relies 
heavily on the willingness and capacity of 
disadvantaged individuals to engage in 
complex adversarial litigation. […] 
However, it is difficult for legislation alone 
to tackle the complex and deep-rooted 
patterns of inequality experienced by some 
groups. Positive measures may be 
necessary to compensate for long-standing 
inequalities suffered by groups of people 
who, historically, have not had access to 
equal opportunities.”26 
 
In line with the realisation that systematic 
oppression cannot be solved speedily 
without positive measures to better the 
conditions for underprivileged groups, the 
EU has produced resolutions, strategies, 
recommendations, communications and 
funding programmes for national 
initiatives.27 It has however, to a large 
degree left practical legislation to the 
member states, because each member 
state has different minorities to consider. 
For ethnic groups such as the Roma that 
are present and face exclusion in several 
EU countries, the Commission has 
created specific funding options for 
member states improving conditions for 
Roma within the guidelines set out in the 
common EU integration strategy.28 The 
European Parliament has also adopted a 
resolution urging all member states to 
                                              
 
26 European Commission: COM 224/2005: 6 
27 Ibid.: 10 
28 Report on the implementation of the EU 
Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies 
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become signatories to the Council of 
Europe’s European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages (ECRML) and the 
Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (FCPNM).29 
 
Thus, the EU does use a collective 
approach to the issue of discrimination of 
ethnic minorities, and the procedures and 
the programmes it supports within the 
union are similar to the ones it advocates 
for and finances in candidate states. One 
could argue that while the EUs approach 
to equal treatment of ethnicities does 
include collective measures, it is not in 
the strictest sense minority rights. There 
is legislation, programmes and funding on 
the issue, but collective minority rights 
are not provided in the CFREU or in the 
treaties. In a response to this, I would 
however argue, that the EU has not 
required this in the candidate states 
either. The most recent EU member, 
Croatia, received praise for its 
Constitutional Act on Human Rights and 
Freedoms and the Rights of Ethnic and 
National Communities and Minorities 
(CAHRNM), which came into force in 2002 
immediately followed by the country’s 
elevation from SAP country to candidate 
state. These collective rights received great 
attention in the EU and the successful 
implementation of the CAHRNM was 
repeatedly noted as a prerequisite for 
progress in EU negotiations.30 There is, 
however, a catch. The CAHRNM is despite 
the presence of ‘constitutional’ in its 
name, just a regular law adopted through 
the regular legislation process in the 
Croatian parliaments. The rights and tools 
it prescribes have the legal force of law, 
not constitutional force.31 With this in 
mind, the legislation and programmes to 
better conditions for minorities are similar 
                                              
 
29 European Parliament: Motion for a European 
Parliament Resolution on endangered European 
languages and linguistic diversity in the European 
Union 
30 European Commission: Croatia Progress Report 
2005: 110 
31 Notification from the Croatian Constitutional 
Court U-X-838/2012: 11 
within the EU and in its conditionality 
towards candidate states.  
 
In addition to its collective policies 
towards disadvantaged minorities, the EU 
has in place a distinction between 
national groups that is remarkably similar 
to the Yugoslavian system of constituent 
peoples and national minorities. In EU 
terminology there is a distinction between 
first, second and third country nationals. 
First country nationals refer to European 
citizens living in the country where they 
have their national citizenship, a German 
in Germany. Second country nationals are 
European citizens living within the EU but 
in another member state than where they 
have their national citizenship, a German 
in France, and third country nationals are 
people from outside the EU residing in an 
EU country, a Turk in France, or a Turk 
with permanent residency in France who 
has come to Germany for work. The 
prohibition of discrimination against 
second and third country nationals is 
prescribed in two distinct Council 
directives. The directive implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin32 for first and second-country 
nationals, and the directive concerning 
the status of third-country nationals.33  
 
European Union conditionality within 
the Stabilisation and Association 
Process concerning minority rights 
The EU has changed fundamentally, as it 
has grown in size from the community of 
six nations in 1953 to today’s union of 28 
different countries and a number of lesser 
integrated potential member states. Its 
strategy for accepting new members has 
changed accordingly. In the first three 
enlargements, which brought the number 
of member states to twelve, the 
harmonisation with the acquis took place 
in a transition period after the new 
member had joined the union to ensure 
its ability to compete on the single 
                                              
 
32 Council Directive 2000/43/EC: Article 3(2). 
33 Council Directive 2003/109/EC: Article 3(1) 
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market.34 Following the fall of the iron 
curtain in the beginning of the 1990s, the 
number of potential EU member states 
grew. In that same period, Turkey also 
approached the union for further 
integration. These developments led to a 
shift in public opinion within the EU and 
the emergence of the concept of the EU’s 
absorption capacity. The concept entailed 
that in integrating new member states, it 
was not only the competition abilities in 
their home economies that were in 
question, it was also the momentum of 
integration for the existing EU member 
states.35 For the enlargement strategy, 
this change in international relations and 
domestic opinion resulted in two things. 
First, it was decided that the 
harmonisation process would take place 
before accession rather than after, and 
second the Copenhagen Criteria were 
established to review the specific issues 
for post-communist states.36 
 
 Three EFTA countries, Sweden, 
Austria and Finland joined the union in 
1995 before the full scale change to the 
new accession rules. The main theme for 
the 2004 enlargement was the application 
of the Copenhagen criteria. The acquis 
was divided into 31 negotiation chapters 
to ensure that all aspects of 
harmonisation were covered before 
accession. This approach was also the 
template for the 2007 and 2013 
enlargements, although the number of 
chapters has risen to 35.37 
  
Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, the 
EU first pursued bilateral relations with 
the newly formed states. It was not until 
after the war in Kosovo that the EU 
officially recognised the Western Balkans 
as potential candidate states for 
accession. Christian Pippan has suggested 
that this timing suggests that the 
conditionality approach for simple 
bilateral agreements established a few 
                                              
 
34 Schütze 2012: 18-37 
35 Accession process EUR-Lex - l14536 
36 European Council: Press release Copenhagen 1993 
37 Szołucha 2010: 8 
years earlier was not effective.38 The 
Copenhagen criteria played a large role in 
relations with the post-Yugoslavian 
countries, but where the 2004 and 2007 
candidate states had struggled most with 
the economic criteria, the political criteria 
received particular attention in the post-
war states.  
 
Stable institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities; 
A functioning market economy and the 
capacity to cope with competition and 
market forces in the EU; 
 
The ability to take on and implement 
effectively the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union.39 
 
In the 1990s, the EU declared its 
intentions to develop bilateral relations 
with the new countries in the Western 
Balkans on the principle of conditionality 
to promote peace, stability, economic 
revival, rule of law and higher human 
rights standards particularly within the 
field of minority rights.40  
 
 In the conditions listed in the 
Council conclusions from 1997 to be 
fulfilled before negotiations for contractual 
relations (SAAs) could begin, there is a set 
of general conditions and lists of 
conditions specifically for each potential 
candidate. In the field of minority rights, 
both individual and collective rights were 
utilised as well as different degrees of 
positive duties for the states in order to 
achieve them. In individual minority rights 
can be mentioned general condition 
number 4, “[…] engage in democratic 
reforms to comply with generally 
recognised standards of human and 
minority rights.” and 6, “Absence of 
generally discriminatory treatment and 
harassment of minorities by public 
                                              
 
38 Pippan 2004: 219 
39 The Copenhagen criteria – Press release 
Copenhagen 1993: 7A(iii) and Conditions for 
membership, europa.eu. 
40 Council conclusions 7738, 1997: annex III 
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authorities”41. Collective rights were to be 
extended to displaced persons,42 and 
compliance was expected with the Dayton 
Agreement, which is based on collective 
ethnic rights.43 The EU also demanded 
collective rights for specific population 
groups. Croatia was to better relations 
with the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia,44 
while the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, 
today Serbia, FYROM and Montenegro, 
had to grant additional autonomy to 
Kosovo.45 
 
 In April 2001, there was a change 
in the EUs conditionality policy towards 
the Western Balkans in that a review 
mechanism was established for 
monitoring compliance with the council 
conclusions from 1997.46 The council 
conclusions on the Western Balkans in 
April 2001 were largely positive with 
special praise of FYROM’s handling of the 
crisis with the local Albanians,47 so the 
review mechanism was not established as 
a punishment or a scrutiny established 
following bad experiences. The mechanism 
consists of yearly country reports with 
recommendations conducted by the 
Commission on the basis of information 
gathered from the EUs own institutions 
and delegations in the area as well as 
reports by international organisations. It 
reviews if compliance is in line with the 
current level of integration with the EU 
and suggests improvements that can 
bring the country in question closer to EU 
membership.48 In the case of a negative 
assessment by the Council, negative 
measures can be employed from 
postponement of new cooperation 
initiatives to part or full suspension of 
cooperation and funding.49 In practice, 
however, the negative consequences of 
                                              
 
41 Ibid.: Annex III contractual relations 
42 Ibid.: general condition 1.  
43 Ibid.: general condition 10 
44 Ibid.: Croatian specific conditions 1 and 2 
45 Ibid.: FRY specific conditions 2 and 3. 
46 General Affairs Council, 2342nd Council 
Meeting,Luxembourg, 9 April 2001, Press release 
141: Items approved: I 
47 Ibid.: Items debated: 5 
48 Pippan 2004: 239 
49 Ibid.: 240 
scrutiny have been rare and never 
amounted to more than postponement or 
rather threat of postponement of 
integration, specifically in connection with 
incomplete cooperation with the ICTY by 
Croatia in the early 2000s.50  
 
Conclusion 
When it comes to human rights, collective 
positive minority rights is one of the most 
difficult ones to get lawmakers and 
populations on board with and to enforce. 
Beneficial programmes or rights for 
specific population groups that are by 
their history or their numbers 
disadvantaged, can be very unpopular 
with the majority population or other 
minorities. When establishing beneficial 
programmes for specific minorities there is 
also a risk that other minorities are 
forgotten. It is easier to get widespread 
support for individual and largely negative 
minority rights, such as the principle of 
non-discrimination. Despite these 
practicalities and implementation issues, 
there is broad support in human rights 
advocacy that collective minority rights 
may be the only way to ensure real 
equality when battling systematic 
discrimination.51 The EU has declared the 
necessity of what it determines anti-
discrimination measures for 
systematically oppressed groups, ethnic or 
otherwise.52 
 
 In connection with EU 
conditionality towards the Western Balkan 
states, the EU has based further 
integration and benefits from EU 
programmes, among other things on the 
countries’ compliance with collective 
minority protection goals. This has led to 
some criticism that the EU is demanding 
more extensive minority protection in 
third countries and candidate states than 
in its member states. I will argue, that this 
is not the case. The EU has articles in 
place in its treaties53 to legislate on 
                                              
 
50 Ibid.: 241 
51 FCPMR Article 4, Jovanovic 2005: 627 
52 European Commission: COM 224/2005 
53 TFEU Article 19 
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minority issues, it has declarations in 
place to pursue collective rights’ 
approaches to systematic oppression, and 
it has programmes with funding in place 
to encourage member states to enact 
national legislation and benefits 
programmes for minorities. The EUs 
policy for encouraging member states to 
work for minority rights are remarkably 
similar to its conditionality towards the 
Western Balkans. The difference lies in 
the power dynamic. EU soft power is 
much stronger towards the candidate 
states because the carrot of membership 
and programme funding is greater than 
only programme funding, which is what 
existing member states can achieve. The 
EU could attempt to increase its legal 
options for negative consequences for 
member states that do not fulfil their 
obligations concerning minority 
protection.54 However, if we look at the 
actual policy space available this is not 
possible under the current treaties, and 
given the mixed reactions to legal 
collective minority measures, it is unlikely 
that future treaties will be changed to 
allow it. With that in mind, strict 
conditionality towards future member 
states may be the best option for 
importing the tradition of collective 
minority rights into the EU. 
  
In conclusion, I found that the narrative of 
the EU double standard is problematic. 
The practical situation is more complex 
than member states being let off easier 
than candidate states. The EU works on 
soft power, and it has repeatedly utilised 
this power for protection of minorities. The 
tools it utilises are the same towards 
candidate states and member states, 
resolutions, campaigns, funding 
programmes and other forms of nudging 
and suggestions for national legislation. 
The way the approach to candidate and 
member states differentiate is in the legal 
options for negative reinforcement. 
Member states can lose certain privileges 
only if it breaches the core values from 
article 2 in the TEU, and only after several 
                                              
 
54 For an analysis on this consult Pippan 2004. 
votes in the Parliament and unanimity in 
the Council.55 Whereas states under the 
SAP can have rights suspended by simple 
decision by the Council. So far, however, 
negative reinforcements of both kinds are 
rare, and the EU works for the most part 
through positive reinforcements. The 
double standard narrative is damaging 
because it suggests that either collective 
rights are only necessary in the Western 
Balkans because of the wars,56 which 
deprives EU-based minorities from gaining 
benefits. Or it suggests that collective 
minority protection is not good policy 
anywhere, and the EU is just being 
difficult towards the future candidate 
states, which again deprives 
systematically oppressed minorities from 
the positive special treatment needed to 
give them equal opportunities to the 
majority citizens.  
 
                                              
 
55 TEU Article 7 
56 Schwellnuss 2006: 187 
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